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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

THE MEANING AND NATURE OF PROPERTY: HOMEOWNERSHIP
AND SHARED EQUITY IN THE CONTEXT OF POVERTY

MICHAEL DIAMOND*
I. INTRODUCTION
Property is that sole and despotic dominion which one man claims and
exercises over the external things of the world, in total exclusion of the right of
1
any other individual in the universe.

Blackstone’s famous statement, derived from Lockean principals, has
come to exemplify the currently popular, largely unquestioned, view of
property in American society. The statement, however, is an inaccurate
description of what property is in today’s American society. It also leaves
unexamined how highly contested the definition of property has been
throughout our history. Yet the term property or the term ownership has
concerned legal theorists and political philosophers, although not the general
public, for centuries. I began to think systematically about the meaning of
these terms after a student had written a paper for me that challenged the
concept of ownership as applied to shared equity homeownership.2
For some time now, the concept of shared equity ownership has been a
major component of programs offering publicly subsidized homeownership to
low income Americans.3 The student’s claim, however, was that the limitation

* Professor of Law and Director of the Harrison Institute for Housing and Community
Development, Georgetown Law. An earlier version of this paper was presented at Georgetown
Law in a workshop on the Public Nature of Private Property. I want to thank my friend and
colleague, Peter Byrne for his always helpful comments, the participants at the Georgetown
workshop and Daniel Park, my research assistant, for his excellent and imaginative work on this
project. I would also like to thank the participants in the St. Louis University Law School’s
Symposium on PROPERTY OWNERSHIP AND ECONOMIC STABILITY: A NECESSARY
RELATIONSHIP? and the members of the St. Louis University Public Law Review for their work
in putting on the Symposium and for putting out this issue of the Review.
1. J.W. EHRLICH, ERLICH’S BLACKSTONE 113 (1959).
2. Benita Jones, The Property Paradox: Limited Equity Housing Cooperatives and the
Challenge of African-American Wealth Creation (Apr. 2007) (unpublished paper, Georgetown
Law) (on file with author).
3. Shared equity housing is housing in which the increase in value of a home is shared
between the home owner and some other party. That party might be an investor, a governmental
entity, a community based lender or future, as yet unknown, low income buyers of the property.
When used in low income situations, it is a device to preserve the affordability of the property.
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on the equity that a low-income homeowner is permitted to take out of the
property upon its sale relegated that homeowner to a second class status. I had
not previously thought of the problem in these terms but instead had been a
proponent of sharing equity as a means of preserving long-term affordability.4
Thus, I began rethinking my position on shared equity.
I undertook this re-examination with a working hypothesis-that property is
a culturally constructed concept. The content of the term depends on the
culture in which it is employed and, within any particular culture, very often
upon the period in which the concept is being discussed. Joseph Singer has put
it quite well when he said that “[p]roperty rights must be understood as both
contingent and contextual.”5
This essay is the result of my re-considering the idea of property in the
context of shared equity for low income homeowners. In the essay, I will
examine the meaning of property in cultural, philosophical, and political
thought. I will then examine property in the context of the legal and political
history of the United States. After tracing an intellectual history of the idea of
property in America, I will focus on modern American society and on the
widespread and deep public regulation of private property and on the
acceptance of this regulation by an overwhelming portion of the American
public and its politicians. Finally, I will consider shared equity housing and
suggest that the limitations it imposes on the rights of an owner to retain the
full equity of property upon its sale is not inconsistent with major strains of
legal and political American thought and is not significantly different from
many other restrictions on owners of property that are currently accepted as
given (even essential) elements of our legal and cultural landscape.
I come to this issue, I must confess, with a longstanding set of beliefs. For
decades, I have been interested, both academically and as a practitioner, in the
provision (or, more precisely, the lack of provision) by society of decent,
affordable housing for low and moderate income residents. There is not
enough of such housing and the shortfall has become more pressing over time.6
More affordable units leave the housing stock each year than enter it.7

See JOHN EMMEUS DAVIS, SHARED EQUITY HOMEOWNERSHIP: THE CHANGING LANDSCAPE OF
RESALE-RESTRICTED, OWNER-OCCUPIED HOUSING 1–12 (2006), http://www.nhi.org/pdf/Shared
EquityHome.pdf (providing a comprehensive discussion of shared equity housing).
4. See generally Michael Diamond, Rehabilitation of Low-Income Housing Through
Cooperative Conversion by Tenants, 25 AM. U. L. REV. 285 (1976).
5. Joseph William Singer, Property and Social Relations: From Title to Entitlement, in
PROPERTY AND VALUES: ALTERNATIVES TO PUBLIC AND PRIVATE OWNERSHIP 3, 10 (Charles
Geisler & Gail Daneker eds., 2000).
6. U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. AND URBAN DEV., OFFICE OF POLICY DEV. & RESEARCH,
AFFORDABLE HOUSING NEEDS 2005: REPORT TO CONGRESS 1–5 (2007), http://www.hud
user.org/Publications/pdf/AffHsgNeeds.pdf.
7. See id. at 23–25.
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Among the approaches to staunch the decline of decent, affordable housing
units has been the effort to preserve the existing stock of such units and to
improve that stock through moderate rehabilitation. Often, this has taken the
The acquisition and
form of tenant ownership of affordable units.8
rehabilitation of these units by low income residents has in many instances
been subsidized through the use of public funds. As a partial quid pro quo for
the use of such funds, governments often require that the deed or covenants
that run with the land include a restraint on the alienability of the subsidized
units; that is, there are restrictions placed on the homeowner’s ability to sell the
unit for its full market value and to retain the proceeds.9 Critics suggest that
this restriction dampens a major part of the American Dream; the portion in
which homeownership is a method to accumulate wealth and, in the case of
low income homeowners, to escape poverty.10
This critique has led to a debate among advocates of affordable housing
about what should be the goal of our housing policy; long-term preservation of
affordable units through resale restrictions or wealth creation for low income
families. While none of the advocates for either of these positions thinks that
the other position is unworthy, each believes that his or her own preference
ought to have the highest societal priority. Since the two goals-preservation
and wealth creation-cannot, in a world of finite resources, be maximized
simultaneously, prioritizing one goal substantially negates the ability to

8. Diamond, supra note 4, at 285, 295–96; see also Duncan Kennedy, The Limited Equity
Coop as a Vehicle for Affordable Housing in a Race and Class Divided Society, 46 HOW. L.J. 85
(2002); COAL. OF NONPROFIT HOUS. & ECON. DEV., A STUDY OF LIMITED-EQUITY
COOPERATIVES IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 23–27 (2004), http://www.cnhed.org/image/
123800_c_sU127242_s_i189945/Coop%20Study%20PDF.pdf.
9. See, e.g., 24 C.F.R. § 203.41 (2009) (Federal Housing Administration regulation that
requires affordable covenants and land leases to have resale restrictions).
§ 203.41(d)(1):
(1) Except as otherwise provided in the HOME Investment Partnerships (HOME) and the
Homeownership and Opportunity for People Everywhere (HOPE) programs, the
mortgagor may be prohibited from selling the property at a price greater than the price
permitted under the program, or the mortgagor may be required to pay a portion of the
sales proceeds to a governmental body or an eligible nonprofit organization, as long as the
mortgagor is not prohibited from recovering:
(i) The sum of the mortgagor’s original purchase price, the mortgagor’s reasonable costs
of sale, the reasonable costs of improvements made by the mortgagor, and any negative
amortization on a graduated payment mortgage insured under § 203.45 of this part; and
(ii) A reasonable share, as determined by the Secretary, of the appreciation in value which
shall be the sale price reduced by the sum determined under paragraph (d)(1)(I) of this
section.
10. See DAVIS, supra note 3, at 9–10 (weighing the claims and criticisms of shared equity
housing from the viewpoint of individual versus community wealth creation).
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achieve the other. Attempts at some form of “splitting the difference” between
them has left each side unsatisfied. This conundrum, what I have called in
another paper “the conflict of competing social goods,”11 leaves one pondering
how society ought to choose among incommensurable goals.12
While that conundrum remains perplexing, I want to move beyond it and
continue an exploration of the cultural construction of property that I began in
the Cultural Construction of Property paper. In this paper, I want to extend
that inquiry and examine the various meanings of property and ownership in
American legal and political history. In particular I want to look at whether the
resale restraints placed on publicly financed affordable homeownership units
really stray very far from the mainstream of our understanding of property and
its use.
In Part II of the paper, I describe the nature of the restrictions often placed
on the resale of publicly financed housing and describe the contours of the
debate over those restrictions. In Part III, I briefly revisit the philosophic and
cultural aspects of the concept of property. In Part IV, I discuss the legal and
political meaning of property through American history and the complexities
of its meaning today. In Part V, I argue that the resale restrictions placed on
some subsidized homeowners are appropriate elements of public policy and are
in keeping with a major strain of understanding in American legal and political
thinking about the meaning of property. Moreover, they are consistent with
other restrictions currently placed on private property in order to meet
overriding public concerns.
II. RESALE RESTRICTIONS ON PUBLICLY FINANCED AFFORDABLE
HOMEOWNERSHIP
Many states and local jurisdictions have created programs for financing
and rehabilitating affordable housing units.13 Of these, many provide for

11. Michael Diamond, Affordable Housing and the Conflict of Competing Goods: A Policy
Dilemma, in AFFORDABLE HOUSING AND PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS (Nestor M. Davidson
& Robin Paul Malloy eds., 2009).
12. Id.
13. See Tenant Opportunity to Purchase Act, D.C. CODE § 42-3404.02 (2001) (giving
tenants the opportunity to buy residential rental housing when it is offered for sale); Housing
Production Trust Fund, D.C. CODE § 42-2802 (2001) (establishing a dedicated fund for the
development of affordable housing); http://www.hud.gov/offices/pih/pihcc/housing_trust_fund_
websites.pdf (providing a list of state housing trust funds); First Right to Purchase Program, D.C.
MUN. REGS. tit. 14, §§ 2700–2799 (1983) (for the regulations governing one of the District of
Columbia’s non-trust fund programs for financing affordable housing). Many other types of
programs assist or encourage the development and improvement of affordable housing. See, e.g.,
N.Y. Affordable Housing Tax Exemption Program, N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 421-a
(McKinney 2007); California Housing Element Statute, CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 65580–65589.8
(West 2007) (requires a “fair share” approach to housing where local government must take into

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2009]

THE MEANING AND NATURE OF PROPERTY

89

homeownership opportunities for low income residents.14 Often, in exchange
for very favorable public financing, the borrower must agree to restrictions on
the amount of equity the borrower can retain when the unit is sold. The
provisions implementing the restrictions are usually found in the deed or in
covenants that run with the land. The limitations may be expressed as a
formulaic increase in the borrower’s permitted equity based on such factors as
the amount of the down payment, the cost of improvements made to the
property, the amortization of the mortgage and the length of ownership. The
borrower/seller may typically recover what he or she put into the property plus
some factor that is based on length of tenure. The balance of the equity
remains in the property as a subsidy to the next qualified buyer.
A variation on this theme is that the full equity is available at settlement
but the amount of equity above what is permissible under the formula is
remitted to the lending jurisdiction to replenish its capital for further lending to
low income homebuyers. A major drawback of this variation is that by
permitting the full equity to be withdrawn at the time of resale, there is a risk
that the unit will be forever removed from the affordable stock. On the other
hand, it gives the lender additional capital to subsidize further units. In my
view, the first method is preferable to the second because it preserves the
affordability of the unit. However, in today’s economic crisis, the availability
of funds to subsidize the next affordable unit is so limited that it might be

consideration accommodation of their local housing needs. Mandates municipalities to tailor
their real estate development policies to aid in the production of new housing for all income
groups); Massachusetts Low and Moderate Income Housing Act, MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 40B, §§
20–23 (2009) (in a municipality where less than 10% of its housing qualifies as affordable a
developer can override local zoning rules to build new developments as long as 20% of the new
units have long-term affordability restrictions); New Jersey Fair Housing Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§
52:27D-301–307 (West 2009) (municipality’s land use regulations must be revised to encourage
the development of affordable housing and contain measures to keep the low income units
affordable).
14. The federal government has programs promoting homeownership. For an example, see
the federal First Time Homebuyer Credit, 26 U.S.C. §§ 36(a)–(b)(1)(A) (2006) (providing an
income tax credit of up to $8,000 for first time homebuyers). For state programs, see the
California tax credit, CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 17059 (West 2009) (offering a credit of $10,000
or 5% of the home’s price, whichever is less for new home buyers). See also Tenant Opportunity
to Purchase Act, D.C. CODE § 42-3404.02 (2001) (giving tenants the opportunity to buy
residential rental housing when it is offered for sale); First Right to Purchase Program, D.C. MUN.
REGS. tit. 14, §§ 2700–2799 (1983) (for the regulations governing one of the District of
Columbia’s non-trust fund programs for financing affordable housing); City of Buffalo, Urban
Homestead Program, http://www.ci.buffalo.ny.us/Home/City_Departments/RealEstate/Urban
HomesteadProgram (last visited Feb. 1, 2010) (describing Buffalo’s Urban Homestead Program);
see generally Mother Earth News, Urban Homesteading, http://www.motherearthnews.com/
Modern-Homesteading/1980-09-01/Community-Homesteading-Programs.aspx (last visited Feb.
1, 2010).
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beneficial to put funds back into the lender’s coffers if it could be assured that
the lender would make new affordable housing loans.15
In an alternative form of limitation there is no restriction placed directly on
the equity that the borrower/seller can take from the property upon resale.
Instead, the constraint lies in to whom the borrower/seller may re-sell the
property. This is usually expressed as a limitation in the deed or in covenants
that run with the land as to who may be a financially eligible buyer. This is
typically a household at or below a fixed percentage of the area median income
(AMI). This creates an equity limitation in that the resale price, when
calculated as the amount the new buyer would have to pay on a monthly basis
to amortize the mortgage (plus certain other specified housing costs, such as
utilities, taxes and insurance), would have to be within 30% of the monthly
income for someone at the top of the eligible income bracket.16
With either form of restriction, the original buyer is permitted to secure
some degree of benefit from the investment aspect of homeownership. The
balance of the equity, however, remains, directly or indirectly for use by future
low income home buyers. These restrictions provide obvious benefits to
society from the long term preservation of affordable housing but there are also
costs. Society might have funds tied up for a considerable period in each
building it assists. This would limit, in the aggregate, the number of units or
households that could be assisted.
There are costs to the individual borrower as well. When that borrower
seeks to sell his or her unit, that seller may not be able to obtain enough net
proceeds to permit him or her to buy a home in the unsubsidized market. Thus,
not only will the seller potentially remain in poverty, but the society will be
faced with the problem of providing another affordable unit, perhaps through a
new subsidy, to the low income seller.
Of course, if there were no restrictions on the resale of the unit, the
borrower, theoretically, could capture all of the equity through a sale to a
market rate buyer. This might aid the seller in escaping poverty but it creates
the risk that the unit will be made too expensive for another low income buyer
to afford. Thus an affordable unit will have left the market with the great
likelihood of not being replaced. This would result in a further shortage of

15. There are other reasons why I believe this variation is inefficient. The amount of equity
being withdrawn in any resale will probably not equal the amount of subsidy originally provided.
Moreover, it is likely that, over time, the price of housing will increase making the original
subsidy potentially inadequate even if the full amount of the subsidy is withdrawn. In addition,
there are significant transaction costs associated with the recapture and relending of the funds.
Finally, there can be only limited current assurances that the funds recaptured will be re-used in
the affordable housing arena. The major inefficiency, of course, is that an affordable unit is likely
to leave the housing stock with no likelihood of a replacement entering the market.
16. See, e.g., FAIR HOUSING RHODE ISLAND, TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE GUIDE app. 8, at 40
(2007), http://www.fairhousingri.org/techguide/11_LongtrmAff_ResaleRestQA.pdf.
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affordable housing at the expense of future low income individuals and,
ultimately, of the society.
III. THE CONCEPT OF PROPERTY ACROSS TIME AND CULTURE
As I have indicated, the concept of property has varied over time and
between cultures. In this section, I will give a brief overview of some of the
significant variations in meaning. Some of these will be reprised in Part IV as
the underpinnings of American legal thought about the meaning and use of
property.
A.

Traditional Non Western Views of Land Ownership

As early as the 6th century BCE, Confucius developed a complex view of
property that combined significant elements of what were to become the
market economies of capitalist culture along with a more communalist view in
which the state was obliged to secure for the people the basic means of their
subsistence. He called for an interventionist model and supported, for
example, a fair distribution of goods.17 This view was reiterated by Mensius, a
follower of Confucius, who, while affirming the concept of private property,
also argued that the government should control the distribution and use of land
to assure the subsistence of the people.18
Similarly, the traditional Islamic view of property rights conceived of a
dual ownership of property between a human being and Allah. The land was
thought to be a sacred trust that must be used productively but without
exploitation or hoarding.19 Thus, the land owner may benefit from his or her
land but only within a circumscribed range. The concept was not one of
unlimited dominion. Property rights were essentially either public, state, or
private. Private rights depended on use and public lands might be converted to
the private realm by productive use of such land. On the other hand, private,
unused land might revert to the state. The public nature of the ownership of
land in traditional Islamic law was that landowners were required to pay a levy
of a part of the earnings from the land for the benefit of the poor. This levy
was not viewed as voluntary charity but as a social obligation and,
correlatively, as a right of the poor to receive.20
Various Native American Nations have also viewed property rights
differently from those of the archetypal western model. While most
recognized individual rights in personal property, their view of rights in land

17. Daniel A. Bell, Confucian Constraints on Property Rights, in CONFUCIANISM FOR THE
MODERN WORLD 222–25 (Daniel A. Bell & Hahm Chaibong eds., 2003).
18. Id. at 237, 239.
19. SIRAJ SAIT & HILARY LIM, LAND, LAW AND ISLAM: PROPERTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN
THE MUSLIM WORLD 11 (2006).
20. Id. at 12–14.
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varied widely. Many nations did not recognize individual property interests in
land. In some cases this was because tribes were nomadic and such interests
were not relevant to their existence or were even adverse to it.21 Others had a
more communal or even spiritual sense about the land. They viewed the land
as belonging to all and no individual could exercise complete dominion over
it.22 While individuals who occupied particular land could enjoy the fruits of
their labor, they had an obligation to preserve the land for future generations.
They merely used the land in trust, an example of tenure from which the
stewardship concept developed.23
B.

The Western Legal Tradition

For more than two millennia, thinkers have considered the nature and
meaning of property. Variants have run the gamut from communal ownership
to stewardship to absolute dominion. For example, Plato had rejected the
concept of private property and argued instead for commonly owned property.
Rulers would have no private property while other property would be held for
the common good.24 Thomas More and Karl Marx echoed the call for
communally owned property, More espoused a humanist Christian perspective
that in order to avoid the otherwise certain oppression of the poor, private
property should be abolished and property should be held communally.25

21. Carol M. Rose, Possession as the Origin of Property, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 73, 87 (1985).
22. PAUL H. CARLSON, THE PLAINS INDIANS 111 (1998).
23. See Lynton Keith Caldwell, Land and the Law: Problems in Legal Philosophy, 1986 U.
ILL. L. REV. 319 (1986) (contrasting the stewardship ethic with the typical American concept of
land dominion).
24. PLATO, THE REPUBLIC 161–63 (H.D.P. Lee trans., Penguin Books 1962).
25. See THOMAS MORE, UTOPIA 30 (PF Collier & Son, Colonial Press 1901) (1516).
Though to speak plainly my real sentiments, I must freely own that as long as there is any
property, and while property is the standard of all other things, I cannot think that a nation
can be governed either justly or happily: not justly, because the best things will fall to the
share of the worst men; nor happily, because all things will be divided among a few and
even these are not in all respects happy), the rest being left to be absolutely miserable.
See also Peter W. Salsich Jr., Property Law Serves Human Society: A First-Year Course Agenda,
46 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 617, 617–18 (2002).
The religious concept of stewardship is derived from the belief that all material goods,
including land, belonged to God. The earth and everything in it was created by God.
Humankind was created in the image and likeness of God and given dominion over
material goods of the earth. Since all humans are created in God’s likeness, all have a
claim to the earth’s bounty. Individuals may appropriate what they need for their own
sustenance and development but only what they need. Civil title to land, while giving the
holder substantial power to possess, use, and dispose of that land, is not absolute. With
title comes a responsibility to care for the land and use it wisely for the betterment of the
landowner, the landowner’s community, and future generations. The landowner, as
steward, will ultimately be asked to give an accounting of that use to God, the Master.
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Marx believed, as did many of the English economic philosophers, that
property involved an interaction between people and things, not, as is a
common belief today, a relationship between person and person. He went on
to argue, however, that property in private hands tended toward an inequitable
power relationship between people, those that had property and those who had
not. In order to retain the classical view of property as a relationship between
a person and an object, and to avoid the oppression of the propertyless class,
property had to be held by the public rather than by private individuals.26
There are among western thinkers, of course, differing views of property.
John Locke, for example, is widely viewed as the progenitor of the market
sense of property. According to Locke, property rights pre-date the political
state and arise from the labor of the first occupier.27 Government, according to
Locke, was designed to protect the property rights of its citizens and was not to
interfere with their use of their property.28 But even Locke placed restrictions
on the use of property. One may only take as much as one can use before it
spoils and one must leave “enough and as good” for others. This recognition
of the limits of private ownership is as much a part of Locke as the recognition
of the right to private ownership.
At about the same time Locke was writing about individual rights of
property as a protection against encroachment by others, The Diggers (or
Levelers) were arguing for communal ownership to preserve the right to
subsistence for all people. Such access to “soil and to subsistence were
fundamental to freedom.”29 Levelers such as Gerrard Winstanley protested the
enclosures of land by wealthy individuals that deprived the poor of access to
life’s necessities. He argued for communal cultivation of the commons as the
antidote to the despotic power of the wealthy.30
Of course, Blackstone took a different view. At least rhetorically, he
claimed that owners of property had absolute right over its use and
disposition.31 Even as he was writing, the State had already intervened in

26. KARL MARX & FREDERICK ENGELS, THE COMMUNIST MANIFESTO 52 (Verso 1998)
(1848).
The distinguishing feature of communism is not the abolition of property generally, but
the abolition of bourgeois property. But modern bourgeois private property is the final
and most complete expression of the system of producing and appropriating products that
is based on class antagonisms, on the exploitation of the many by the few.
27. JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE ON GOVERNMENT §§ 26–29, at 20 (Prometheus
Books 1986) (1690). For a discussion of Locke’s views of property, see ITAI SENED, THE
POLITICAL INSTITUTION OF PRIVATE PROPERTY (1997).
28. See LOCKE, supra note 27, §§ 138–140, at 77–79.
29. LAURA BRACE, THE POLITICS OF PROPERTY: LABOUR, FREEDOM AND BELONGING 14
(2004).
30. Id. at 19.
31. ERLICH, supra note 1, at 113.
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private property.32 There were restrictions on its use and disposition as well as
it being subject to taxation. Moreover, restrictions on the use of property had
been in place in England even before Blackstone began writing about
“Despotic Dominion.”33 Nevertheless, his claim has had great purchase among
writers about property and its theme has significantly penetrated the common
consciousness about property and ownership.
C. Aspects of Property in Relation to Individuals
Several theories have been developed about property ownership and the
individual. One, the idea of personhood, argues that one’s right to act as a free
individual must be supported by elements allowing self expression.34 Among
these would be one’s right to possess and use private property. There is a good
deal of evidence suggesting that homeownership does, in fact, involve
elements of self expression, autonomy and social capital.35
A second theory derives from Adam Smith and utilizes economic
efficiency as a basis for property rights. Private ownership promotes efficient
use of property in the owner’s self interest. This, in turn, promotes an
economically efficient society. Under this theory, private decisions as to one’s
self interest, spread over a large universe of owners, will aggregate toward the
social good-the invisible hand writ large. Of course, the debate over the ability
of the market to order society in a proper manner has been active for years and
is prominently featured in the current public discourse.
Morris Cohen criticizes both of these theories. Concerning personhood, he
argues that property rights also deny elements of personhood in that they

32. See, e.g., John F. Hart, Colonial Land Use Law and its Significance for Modern Takings
Doctrine, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1252 (1996). In discussing the notion of minimal land use
regulation during the American Colonial period, Hart states “. . . in fact, colonial governments
regulated land use extensively for purposes other than preventing harm.” Id. at 1253.
33. For a discussion of the English antecedents to the American system of the regulation of
property (among other elements of regulation), see WILLIAM J. NOVAK, THE PEOPLE’S
WELFARE: LAW AND REGULATION IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA (1996).
34. See, e.g., MARGARET JANE RADIN, REINTERPRETING PROPERTY 35 (1993).
35. See, e.g., William M. Rohe et al., The Social Benefits and Costs of Homeownership: A
Critical Assessment of the Research 16–17 (Joint Ctr. for Hous. Studies of Harvard Univ.,
Working Paper No. LIHO-0.1.12, 2001), http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/publications/home
ownership/liho01-12.pdf (stating protection of economic interest, transaction costs of moving and
identification with one’s home as reasons for increased participation among homeowners);
WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS 4 (2001); DAVIS, supra note 3, at 110
(“Limited equity cooperatives help to create a space to reconnect local activism with the
neighborhood by enforcing values of civic participation and creating spaces for interaction. The
social and leadership skills that are learned in LECs increase residents’ resources and motivation
for civic participation.”) (quoting Saegert et al., Limited Equity Co-ops as Bulwarks against
Gentrification (2003) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with City University of New York
Graduate Center)).
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include the right to exclude others, thereby at least potentially depriving those
others of their right of self assertion.36 Cohen’s criticism of both the
personhood and efficiency arguments is that they fail to look out for the overall
societal good. Private property cannot, he claims, be sacrosanct and free of
any government restriction.
The issue before thoughtful people is therefore not the maintenance or
abolition of private property, but the determination of the precise lines along
which private enterprise must be given free scope and where it must be
37
restricted in the interests of the common good.

Tom Bethell, a writer in the market/commodification tradition of property
has, nevertheless, struck a similar chord by stating: “Private property is a
compromise between our desire for unrestricted liberty and the recognition that
others have similar desires and rights.”38 Bruce Ackerman, writing in quite a
different tradition, has echoed this position. He has stated, more bluntly, that:
[O]nly the ignorant think it meaningful to talk about owning things free and
clear of further obligation. . . .More precisely, the law of property considers the
way rights to use things may be parceled out amongst a host of competing
39
resource users.

These admonitions have been regularly heeded by modern societies.
Consider the wide range of restrictions that are now accepted by virtually
everyone in many industrialized societies.
Fair housing and public
accommodations laws limit one’s ability to exclude others from one’s property.
Zoning rules tell us how large a building may be and the use to which it may
be put. Building and housing codes tell us how buildings must be constructed
and what amenities they must contain. Warranties of habitability and rent
control laws restrict landlord behavior and income. Environmental laws limit
uses and emissions of and from buildings. Taxes deprive the owner of some of
the value of land and different uses produce different tax obligations, thereby
steering behavior. Finally, the most far-reaching of the limitations on property,
the right of the government to take private property for public use, was
recently very broadly defined by the Supreme Court.40
As has been shown in this section, a wide range of views have been
applied to the concept of property. Many of them provide a counterpoint to
Blackstone’s “despotic dominion” hypothesis. In the following section, I will
examine how the concept of property developed in the American legalpolitical-social context.
36. Morris R. Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L. Q. 8, 11–12 (1928).
37. Id. at 21.
38. TOM BETHELL, THE NOBLEST TRIUMPH: PROPERTY AND PROSPERITY THROUGH THE
AGES 9 (1998).
39. BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION 26 (1977).
40. See Kelo v. New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
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IV. THE MEANING OF PROPERTY IN AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT
Throughout this nation’s history, there has been a struggle between those
who believe that we have a collective responsibility, through, but not limited
to, government, to “promote the general welfare” and those who assert that the
general welfare is and should be best achieved by all pursuing their own selfinterest via “the Market,” with government doing as little as possible, apart
from providing for the common defense.41
Historically, the concept of property has had many meanings and has
fulfilled many goals in civil society. This has also been true in American legal
and political history, which includes a rich vein to the effect that the idea of
property includes a significant social component. To be sure, there is also a
significant vein of thought, in fact the prevalent one, which views property as
being wholly within the control of an owner. We, as a society, view property
as a commodity, a means of exchange that helps to order private interactions
and fulfill private preferences.42 Yet, as Joseph Singer points out, that
domination has always been more theoretical (or mythical) than real.
If we observe the operation of private property systems, we see that full
consideration of property rights in the same person is the exception, rather than
43
the rule; most property rights are shared or divided among several persons.

The way that these interests are divided may tell us something about the
nature of property in the United States. Gregory Alexander, for example, has
posited that two strains of theoretical discourse have been present in American
legal thought throughout our history. The first treats property as a commodity
and corresponds to the prevalent view today that property is an item of private
exchange that allows individuals to pursue their preferences in the market.
This involves a negative sense of liberty in that it assumes individuals are free
to order their relationships unfettered by interference from government. The
second strain, what Alexander, borrowing from Carol Rose, calls “propriety,”
addresses the use of property to create and maintain the “good society,”
whatever that may be.44 In this vision, property has a public function beyond
any private use.

41. Rachel G. Bratt et al., Why a Right to Housing Is Needed and Makes Sense: Editors
Introduction, in A RIGHT TO HOUSING: FOUNDATION FOR A NEW SOCIAL AGENDA 8 (Rachel G.
Bratt et al. eds., 2006).
42. GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, COMMODITY & PROPRIETY: COMPETING VISIONS OF
PROPERTY IN AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT 1 (1997).
43. Singer, supra note 5, at 6.
44. ALEXANDER, supra note 42, at 1.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2009]

THE MEANING AND NATURE OF PROPERTY

97

While several writers have contested this second view,45 there has been
much American legal writing to the effect that property should serve, at least to
some extent, the public good. This strain, however, may not be matched by a
societal implementation of its prescriptions. Moreover, even for those who
consider public benefit a proper purpose for property, there is a debate about
what is a public benefit.
My goal in this section is not to resolve the dispute between those who
believe our government was established to protect (and, in fact, has protected)
interests of the propertied class and those who believe that the government was
established to regulate (and has regulated) property in the public interest.
Instead, in this section I want merely to describe some of the major arguments
on each side of this issue. I will distinguish normative, theoretical positions
from descriptive ones and examine how the government has for generations
regulated private property, at least to some extent, in the public interest and
against the interests of individual title holders.
A.

Individualism and Commodification

Any discussion of individual property rights and the commodification of
property hearkens back, of course, to John Locke and the primacy of individual
liberty. He, and many others, believed that property was a major bulwark
against encroachments on such liberty by the state. This belief has become the
basis for many of the legal protections and rights that Americans enjoy today.46
David Abraham makes an argument that throughout much of American
history, concepts such as freedom of contract and private property were
protected by the law and the courts with the effect that neither government nor
other individuals could intrude on the freedom provided by these devices.
Citing Lochner v. New York47 and similar cases, Abraham argues that:
Never again did the formal equality of contract so fully displace the social
realities that produce contract relations. In this view, exchanges of property in
the market are not only guaranteed freedom but were indeed the very
48
expression of it.

He goes on to quote Edward Corwin critically commenting that the goal of
the Supreme Court seemed to have been to “annex the principles of laissezfaire capitalism to the Constitution and put them beyond the reach of state
legislative power.”49

45. See, e.g., JENNIFER NEDELSKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE LIMITS OF AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONALISM (1990); David Abraham, Liberty Without Equality: The Property-Rights
Connection in a “Negative Citizenship” Regime, 21 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 1 (1996).
46. See NEDELSKY, supra note 45, at 8–9.
47. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
48. Abraham, supra note 45, at 18.
49. Id. (quoting EDWARD CORWIN, THE TWILIGHT OF THE SUPREME COURT 78 (1934)).
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Abraham tracks the negative liberty impulse from the founding of the
nation to the present. He argues that the few periods when the legislatures and
courts broke free from the regnant idea of property as a basis for negative
liberty, Reconstruction, the New Deal, and the Civil Rights era, really were
just slight and temporary inroads into the primacy of private property as an
ordering mechanism for society and a source of rights and power. He quotes
Margaret Radin, who he calls the successor to Reich in the age of Rorty, as
stating:
[T]he best strategy for making gains for the less well-off. . . [is] to drive a
wedge in the ideological justification of property by showing that only a very
small portion of private property rights serve the purposes claimed for property
in general, rather than attempting to disrupt the ideology of property. . . [I] do
50
not think. . . that the ideology of property can be dislodged:

Jennifer Nedelsky also believes that the nation was founded on the
Lockean view of protection of property rights as the means to protect liberty.
She claims that “The Framers’ preoccupation with property generated a
shallow conception of democracy and a system of institutions that allocates
political power unequally and fails to foster political participation.”51 She goes
on to say “For the Framers, the protection of property meant the protection of
unequal property and thus the insulation of both property and inequality from
democratic transformation.”52
While Nedelsky recognizes that the Constitutional Convention proceeded
with a great deal of collaboration and compromise, she believes that the
Federalists and their Lockean view of property and rights carried the day.53
She argues that the conflict between personal rights and property rights was
resolved in favor of property. Her hypothesis is that all people had an interest
in, and thus favored, personal rights while only the propertied classes had an
interest in property rights. Thus, to protect those rights from the masses of the
unpropertied, Constitutional safeguards protecting those rights were created.
This was a largely non-democratic position and made the political rights of the
masses subservient to the property rights of the few.54
Abraham and Nedelsky have developed a descriptive view of how the
sense of property has evolved in American legal and political thought. There
are, of course, many who view this evolution as the normatively correct path.
One, Tom Bethell, has claimed that the “secure, decentralized, private

50. Id. at 28 (quoting Margaret Jane Radin, Lacking a Transformative Social Theory, 45
STAN. L. REV. 409 (1993)).
51. NEDELSKY, supra note 45, at 1.
52. Id. at 2.
53. Nedelsky asserts that the Federalist James Wilson “was the only member of the
Constitutional Convention to proclaim that property was not the object of government.” Id. at 12.
54. Id. at 5.
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ownership of goods,” is a necessary but not sufficient condition for obtaining
the “four great blessings . . . . [of] liberty, justice, peace and prosperity.”55 But
even Bethell recognizes the fact that property does not carry absolute rights but
is a compromise of various, often conflicting, interests.56
B.

Property as an Instrument of Social Good

The primacy of private property in American thought can be seen in the
number of writers, on both the left and right of the political spectrum, who
extol or bemoan its pre-eminent political position. For example, Tony Honoré
has written “If under the system of entitlements the interest awarded to owners
is greater than can reasonably be justified on moral, as opposed to economic
grounds, any resultant distribution of property must be inherently unjust.”57 He
goes on to say “[T]his western system of property law is neither the only
conceivable one, nor the easiest to justify from a moral point of view.”58
In fact, Gregory Alexander has argued that two quite different strains of
theory have characterized American legal and political thought since colonial
times.59 The first, the idea of property as a commodity for market exchange is
in dialectic opposition to the second, property as propriety60 The proprietarian
views of property, as Alexander sees them, have a
“. . .commitment to the basic idea that the core purpose of property is not to
satisfy individual preferences or to increase wealth but to fulfill some prior
normative vision of how society and the polity that governs it should be
61
structured.”

55. BETHELL, supra note 38, at 9.
56. Id.
57. TONY HONORÉ, MAKING LAW BIND 218 (1987). For a contrary view, see Thomas W.
Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Morality of Property, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1849 (2007).
58. See HONORÉ, supra note 57, at 218.
59. ALEXANDER, supra note 42, at 1.
For too long now, legal scholars have tended to accept uncritically the claim that there has
been a single tradition of property throughout American history. Property, according to
this mistaken view, has served one core purpose and has had a single constant meaning
throughout American history: to define in material terms the legal and political sphere
within which individuals are free to pursue their own private agendas and satisfy their
own preferences, free from governmental coercion or other forms of external interference.
Property, according to this understanding, is the foundation of the categorical separation
of the realm of the private and public, individual and collectivity, the market and the
polity.
60. Alexander borrows this term from Carol Rose. It denotes property as a foundation for
the creation and maintenance of the good society, whatever that may be; the “private basis for the
public good.” Id.
61. Id. at 2.
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He argues that such views were already well established in Europe and that
the pre-revolutionary American legal intellectuals were heirs to that tradition62
and the rest of the book offers evidence of the degree to which these views
continued to percolate in our legal and political thought until the late twentieth
century. He concludes that
There is no single American traditional meaning of property. . .Rather, there
have been multiple meanings and multiple traditions of property throughout
63
our history.

Joseph William Singer, echoing the legal realists, also criticizes the
classical view of property suggesting that we should (and that we do)
disaggregate the bundle of property rights and discuss particular entitlements
as separate components.64 He believes property should be viewed as relations
among people rather than between people and things and, in doing so,
distinguishes between classical concepts of title and his preferred model of
informal relations and moral claims.65
C. The Application of the Proprietarian Meaning of Property in American
Political History
Throughout history, we have repeatedly seen government intrude upon the
classic liberal conception of property in order to further some broader social
purpose. What is more, these intrusions have been accepted as reasonable and
essential parts of our society by all but the most zealous Lochnerians. To take
but a few early examples, New York passed a law in the late 1860’s
prohibiting commercial activities along Frederick Law Olmstead’s new
Eastern Parkway in Brooklyn, NY.66 Such rules became comprehensive in
1916 as New York passed the first citywide zoning ordinance. Within ten
years, ordinances such as New York’s were upheld by the United States
Supreme Court in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.67 Zoning ordinances
such as these limited what an owner could do with his or her property and,
given an acceptable use, limited the size, location and height of improvements
on the property.

62. Id. at 8, 384–85.
63. ALEXANDER, supra note 42, at 7.
64. Singer, supra note 5, at 8.
65. Id. at 4–5, 8.
66. IRVING D. FISHER, FREDERICK LAW OLMSTED AND THE CITY PLANNING MOVEMENT IN
THE UNITED STATES 134 (1986); Keith D. Revell, Regulating the Landscape: Real Estate Values,
City Planning and the 1916 Zoning Ordinance, in THE LANDSCAPE OF MODERNITY: NEW YORK
CITY 1900-1940 19 (David Ward & Olivier Zunz eds., 1997).
67. Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
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Similarly, New York passed the Tenement House Act of 1867 which
regulated light, air and facilities in residential buildings.68 These laws evolved
into modern building and housing codes that regulate building materials,
amenities, and general health and safety requirements.69 Progressing along the
legal continuum of the state protecting citizens from the dangers caused by
inadequate or too expensive housing, we have the warranty of habitability70
and rent control laws.71 It takes little imagination to recognize the inroads
these provisions have made on the despotic dominion owners have over
property. Such rules require landlords of residential rental housing to maintain
the property up to the standards of the local housing codes and restrict the
amount that can be charged as rent. They affect the value of the property to the
owner and the owner’s ability to do with his or her property as he or she
pleases.72
Another area in which widely accepted government regulation invades one
of the central sticks in the classical bundle constituting ownership is the right
to exclude. Fair housing and public accommodation laws have made it illegal
to exclude individuals from one’s property for various demographic reasons
such as race, gender, national origin, sexual preference, family status, source of
funds, etc. The underlying rationale for these and other such rules is the need
for public good to override private rights.
V. THE CONCEPT OF PROPERTY AND SHARED EQUITY HOUSING
There is today a significant shortage of affordable housing units and new
affordable units enter the market at a very slow pace.73 At the same time the
demand for such units is growing due to an increase in the number of
households in need of such units.74 In addition to an increased demand for
units, the number of affordable units being lost to the overall stock continues to
68. See RICHARD PLUNZ, A HISTORY OF HOUSING IN NEW YORK CITY: DWELLING TYPE
SOCIAL CHANGE IN THE AMERICAN METROPOLIS 22 (1990). In 1856, the State of New
York created a commission to study substandard housing. Id. at 21. In 1866, the legislature
passed a law setting constructing standards, and in 1867 the first Tenement Housing Act was
passed. Id. at 22. The Tenement Housing Act was subsequently amended and expanded upon in
1879, 1901, and again in 1919. Id. at 24, 85, 123.
69. See, e.g., N.Y. CITY ADMIN. CODE §§ 25-301, 26-405, 27-102, 28-101.2 (2009).
70. See Javins v. First Nat’l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1080 (D.C. Cir. 1970); N.Y. GEN.
LAWS ch. 334, 1901 (repealed 1909).
71. D.C. CODE ANN. § 42-3501.01 (LexisNexis 2003); N.Y. CITY ADMIN. CODE § 26-501
(2009).
72. Other laws that restrict the economic rights of owners include environmental statutes
such as 42 U.S.C. § 7401(a) (2006); 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (2006); D.C. CODE ANN. § 6-1451.01
(LexisNexis Supp. 2009); D.C. CODE ANN. § 42-3404.02 (LexisNexis Supp. 2009); and 42
U.S.C. § 12101 (2006) to name a few.
73. U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. AND URBAN DEV., supra note 6, at 36.
74. Id. at 37.
AND
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grow due to market conditions, owner choice and deterioration.75 Since the
gap between supply and demand is growing, it is critically important for
society to preserve the existing stock of affordable units while increasing the
supply of such units. Use restrictions is one method of preserving affordable
units. These restrictions have the effect of sharing the equity in any for sale
unit with the next buyer or with the society as a whole.
In this section I will pay particular attention to the idea of shared equity as
a means of assisting low income buyers to purchase a home and will conclude
with a discussion of the ethical validity of use restrictions on subsidized
homeowners. I will argue that not only are such restrictions instrumental in
achieving a valued social goal but also that the potential reduction of owner
equity as a result of the restraint is not a significant departure from generally
accepted restrictions on property.
As I stated earlier, the concept of shared equity housing is, essentially, that
some investor, private or public, assists a home buyer in the purchase of a
home. In exchange, the investor requires a share of the equity. In a private
situation, that share is typically distributed directly to the investor at a predetermined point or upon re-sale of the property. The distribution is the
entrepreneurial return for the use of the investor’s funds and for his or her risk.
There are many examples of this form of shared equity in today’s housing
market. Perhaps the most ubiquitous is that of a parent helping a child
purchase a home. There has been a long tradition of the parent or other
relative or friend making a contribution to a down payment in exchange for a
portion of the equity upon resale.76 This model has expanded beyond family
and friends as financial contributors and has become a form of business
investment.77 Evidence suggests that many investors and homeowners desire
this type of arrangement over currently available mortgage products.78 Thus,
the concept of shared equity housing has not been limited to the poor
homebuyer but has spread to all segments of the market, including homebuyers

75. Id.
76. For a discussion of the private shared equity process, see Judy Newman, Balancing the
Cost: Shared Equity Home Ownership Addresses Affordable Housing Needs, ON COMMON
GROUND (Nat’l Ass’n of Realtors, Washington, D.C.), Winter 2008, at 10, 12,
http://www.realtor.org/smart_growth.nsf/docfiles/winter08_balancing_costs.pdf/$file/winter08_b
alancing_costs.pdf (discussing the rise of shared equity homeownership and the costs associated
with it); see also Lending Tree, LLC, Buying a Home with a Shared-Equity Mortgage,
http://www.lendingtree.com/smartborrower/first-time-home-buyers/buying/buy-home-sharedequity-mortgage/ (last visited Feb. 1, 2010).
77. ANDREW CAPLIN ET AL., FANNIE MAE FOUND., SHARED-EQUITY MORTGAGES,
HOUSING AFFORDABILITY, AND HOMEOWNERSHIP 3 (2007), http://cess.nyu.edu/caplin/SEM
2007.pdf (arguing in favor of shared-equity mortgages and suggesting that the financial markets
value shares in homeownership more highly than some homeowners).
78. Id.
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looking for needed and efficient financing and investors looking to capitalize
on historic housing returns.
When the investor is the public, however, the goals of shared equity
investment change.
The goal for the distribution is typically not
entrepreneurial. Rather, the distribution is designed to serve some public good,
for example, preserving the property as affordable to future low income
buyers. Moreover, the public’s share of the equity may or may not actually be
distributed. The more common scheme is that the public’s equity remains in
the property making it more affordable to the next low income buyer. The
original buyer may take out whatever equity was designated at the outset as his
or her share. Subsequent buyers would have to agree to the same arrangement
in order to be eligible to purchase the property.
An alternative involves the distribution of the public’s share of the equity,
together with a payoff of the balance of the underlying mortgage, when the
property is sold. While this method may not preserve as affordable the
particular unit that is being sold, it does return to the public entity a significant
amount of capital that can be used to subsidize another low income buyer.
A.

Homeownership and Preservation

For generations, the American Dream has included an element of
homeownership. From the promise of “forty acres and a mule”79 to the
original Homestead Acts80 to the mortgage interest tax deduction,81 there has
been a national policy of encouraging and supporting ownership. The financial
benefits of homeownership have been well documented and run from the
obvious element of potential wealth creation due to price appreciation on
homes to more opaque forms of increasing overall wealth.82 There are,
however, other benefits of homeownership that have been identified by
commentators.83 They include increased civic participation84 emotional

79. “Forty Acres and a Mule” refers to an order made in W.M. Sherman’s Special Field
Order No. 15 during the Civil War on January 16, 1865.
80. See generally Homestead Act of May 20, 1862, ch. 75, 12 Stat. 392, amended by Act of
Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 561, 26 Stat. 1095.
81. See I.R.C. § 163(h)(3) (West 2009).
82. In addition to appreciation, wealth can be generated from building equity by amortizing
the mortgage while, at the same time, enjoying the occupancy (and thus the rental value) of the
property. It can also be generated through a constant mortgage payment in the face of rising
housing (and rental) values. One lives in a property while paying $X while the rental value is
>$X. The savings over what rent increases would have been as well as the differential between
what the homeowner pays and the value of what he or she receives are forms of wealth creation.
See J. Peter Byrne & Michael Diamond, Affordable Housing, Land Tenure, and Urban Policy:
The Matrix Revealed, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 527, 541–44 (2007).
83. For a general discussion of these benefits, see id. at 577–80.
84. Rohe et al., supra note 35, at 16–17.
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benefits of pride of ownership,85 and the potential for increased capacity and
social capital.86 Homeowners typically have the security of place and, in
addition, their normally longer tenure offers them greater potential for creating
and maintaining connection and community.87
The poor, however, have been largely excluded from these benefits. In
many of today’s urban housing markets,88 the median price of a home is more
than can be afforded even by buyers with occupations such as school teacher,
fire fighter, police officer or nurse.89 Obviously, people with lower paying
jobs would have even more difficulty purchasing a home. The concept of
shared equity was one method designed to rectify this imbalance and to create
greater access to homeownership for the poor. The model preserves
affordability for the long term and prevents affordable units from exiting the
market.
There are, of course, costs associated with sharing equity. Most
conspicuously, the homeowners in a shared equity situation will not realize a
portion (often, a significant portion) of the equity built up in their property.
For the poor, this could mean the loss of an opportunity to escape poverty.
This is the crux of the property issue here. Is the potential loss of that equity a
sufficient basis to argue that the shared equity homeowner has lost an essential
element of ownership? The remainder of this section will argue that it is not.

85. Curtis J. Berger, Home Is Where the Heart Is: A Brief Reply to Professor Epstein, 54
BROOK. L. REV. 1239, 1242 (1989).
86. Byrne & Diamond, supra note 82, at 579.
87. Paula A. Franzese, Does It Take a Village? Privatization, Patterns of Restrictiveness and
the Demise of Community, 47 VILL. L. REV. 553, 585 (2002) (indicating that social interaction
builds social capital).
88. I am excluding the effects of the current financial situation. While home prices have
fallen, there is both greater unemployment and a much more difficult borrowing environment. I
have not seen statistics on the effect of these factors on affordability and the possibility of
actually buying a home. In the District of Columbia, a previously booming housing market,
lending for low-income buyers, which had been available from both public, nonprofit, and some
commercial sources has largely evaporated. The public sector has run out of funds and is making
few new loans. The nonprofit sector had depended on take out commitments from other sources
in order to make their short-term bridge loans and the commercial sector has, for the most part,
abandoned this form of lending. While there are a few commercial exceptions, even with their
lowest interest rates in this market, their loans often make projects unaffordable for low-income
buyers. See Peter A. Tatian & G. Thomas Kingsley, Housing Market Update, DISTRICT OF
COLUMBIA HOUSING MONITOR 9–10 (Winter 2008), http://www.neighborhoodinfodc.org/
housing/DCHousingMonitor_2008_1.pdf.
89. MARGERY AUSTIN TURNER ET AL., FANNIE MAE FOUND., HOUSING IN THE NATION’S
CAPITAL 32 (2005), http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/1000853_HNC2005.pdf.
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The Incongruity of Disparaging Shared Equity Homeownership

The critics of shared equity housing suggest that one of the major property
sticks, the ability to increase one’s wealth from property appreciation, is lost
(or at least impaired) to shared equity homebuyers. They claim that this loss is
what relegates such owners to a second class status. This critique has a certain
resonance and superficial plausibility. Nevertheless, it is, in my view,
misguided for at least two reasons. First, it attempts to compare shared equity
homeownership with non-shared-equity homeownership. This comparison
might be apt if the poor had the choice between the two and were forced into
the shared equity model. This is very unlikely to be the choice actually
available to the poor who are more likely to have a choice, if at all, between
shared-equity homeownership and tenancy in a rental situation. Typically,
housing costs in the unsubsidized market are too high and the underwriting
requirements of lenders too stringent for most of the poor to be able to buy in
such a market.90 Thus, while the poor may be subject to restrictions on equity
that are not imposed on non-subsidized buyers, they have the opportunity for
equity not available to renters, subsidized or otherwise. Moreover, there are
equity restrictions placed on unsubsidized homeowners. For example, the
capital gains tax takes a part of an owner’s equity upon resale when that equity
passes a threshold level.91
The second reason I believe the criticism of shared equity homeownership
is misguided is that it assumes a static definition of homeownership that is
neither essential nor even descriptive. The restriction on equity is merely one
type of restriction on ownership. All owners endure some limitation on their
despotic dominion over property. As I stated at the beginning of this essay,
property is a culturally and temporally specific construct. In the United States,
the understanding of property has, over time, undergone many changes and
continues to spark debate.
1. The Proper Comparison of Tenure Choices
We have already discussed the problem of the shortage of affordable
housing for low income residents. There is not enough decent affordable
housing to meet the demand and some of the existing stock of such housing
leaves the market each year without being replaced. The growing gap will

90. Map of Misery, THE ECONOMIST, May 8, 2008, at 82 (“Optimists point out that some
measures of housing affordability have dramatically improved. According to NAR figures,
monthly payments on a typical house with a 30-year mortgage and 20% down payment were
18.5% of the median family’s income in February, down almost 26% at the peak—and close to
the historical average. But this measure is misleading, not least because credit standards have
tightened. A survey of loan officers conducted by the Fed suggested on May 5th that 60% of
banks tightened their lending standards for prime mortgages in the first three months of 2007.”).
91. I.R.C. § 121 (West 2008).
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continue to cause a variety of social problems ranging from homelessness to
poor health to disengagement from civil society.92 The concept of shared
equity housing must, therefore, be viewed in this context. It is a palliative that
slows down the disintegration of the existing affordable stock. Who is likely
to choose this form of housing over the other possible tenures? Typically the
answer is the poor but that answer leaves far too much unexplained.
Who among the poor are faced with the prospect of sharing equity? In
general, they fall into one of two groups: tenants who have the opportunity of
homeownership using a program subsidized by a public entity or a social
investor; or homeowners who are seeking to refinance their homes using such
a program. The need for refinancing is generally due to the owner having
encountered financial difficulties during his or her non-shared-equity tenure. I
will not say much here about homeowners in financial difficulty. Each had
made a choice of tenure and found, for whatever reason, that it was not feasible
to continue in that tenure. Each, then, had to choose between a return to
renting, which many did, or accept a form of financing that required them to
share equity with an investor. The choice confronting renters is quite different.
Typically, they do not have the opportunity to acquire non-shared-equity
housing. Income, housing prices, lender’s requirements and interest rates may
make this option unrealistic. Thus, to argue that shared-equity housing
imposes an inferior form of homeownership misses the point. In most cases, it
is the only form of homeownership reasonably available to them.
While one might argue that government policy ought to allow subsidized
homebuyers to keep whatever appreciation might exist, this typically is not
what governments do. Moreover, there are sound reasons for the policy as it
exists.
First, there is not sufficient subsidized funding available to
accommodate all of the low income people who would like to purchase a
home. Thus, those who get the opportunity to do so are often the beneficiaries
of fortuitous circumstances. There is typically no moral basis as to why one
potential buyer should be chosen over any other. To allow the windfall of
equity appreciation to be removed from the pool of funds available to house
the poor compounds the problem. Initially, the subsidized buyer had no
particular moral claim on the subsidy yet that buyer now is, at least potentially,
allowed to increase his or her wealth with public dollars that might have been
used to assist another low income buyer. This converts public funds into a
private windfall. Secondly, an affordable unit has left the affordable stock
forever and is unlikely to be replaced, thereby permanently reducing the
affordable stock.
Another shortcoming of the critique of shared equity homeownership is its
implicit assumption that the shared equity model has been imposed on low

92. See Byrne & Diamond, supra note 82, at 534–35.
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income buyers. Far from being imposed, when it is available it is often sought
by tenants as a desirable form of tenure. If it is offered, a tenant may choose it,
or not. Just as the tenant has a choice of whether to agree to equity limitations,
the lender offering the subsidized financing has its own choices as to how to
use its resources. If the lender’s choice is to preserve the affordability of a unit
by restricting equity, the potential buyer has the opportunity to respond as he
or she chooses.
In many cases, buyers choose to pursue the shared equity model of
ownership. Ownership of real property offers security of tenure, control over
living environment, a stake in community, a sense of identity and, of course, a
possibility of wealth creation. Shared equity homeownership offers most of
these features in a degree equal to and, in some cases, greater than any other
form of ownership. It is the limitation on wealth creation that motivates critics
to label shared equity as an inferior form of ownership. They do not examine
the other benefits to homeowners and to the surrounding communities.
In a comprehensive study of shared equity housing for the National
Housing Institute, John Emmeus Davis examined several performance
standards in order to evaluate shared equity housing.93 Davis examined the
performance of shared equity housing in the areas of affordability, stability,
involvement and improvement as well as wealth.94 While in some cases the
evidence was mixed or inconclusive, he did find evidence of good performance
in these areas, particularly when considering limited equity cooperatives.
Other research has shown some of the indirect benefits associated with
homeownership; better health of occupants, better achievement in school of the
children of homeowners, and more civic involvement.95
Even on the issue of wealth creation, Davis has found that owners of
shared equity housing do accumulate wealth. The question for him is not
whether there is wealth creation but whether the amount of wealth created is
sufficient.96 The answer depends on what is meant by sufficient. For example,
if the limited return is commensurate with what the open market would have
provided,97 the question has little meaning. If it is less than what the market
would have provided, the question is whether the limitations on equity are at
least balanced by other gains of the homeowner and the gains of the society.
Similarly, if the wealth created by shared equity ownership is measured against

93. DAVIS, supra note 3, at 89–114.
94. Id.
95. See Byrne & Diamond, supra note 82, at 602.
96. DAVIS, supra note 3, at 103.
97. For example, if the market price of the unit is less than what the equity formula would
have given the seller, the seller will have suffered no harm by virtue of the limitation. In poor
communities, often realizing slow or no appreciation in home prices, this would not be an
uncommon occurrence. See id. at 77–78.
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the wealth created by renting, the answer weighs heavily in favor of shared
equity ownership.
There has also been criticism of the claim that the correct comparison is
between shared equity homeowners and renters, not shared equity homeowners
and other homeowners.98 The critique is that society subsidize all homeowners
through the mortgage interest and property tax deductions but we do not ask all
homeowners with these subsidies to share their equity.
While this critique seems on point, I believe it is inapt. One might argue
generally against the breadth and depth of the mortgage interest and real estate
tax deductions for all homeowners, particularly high bracket homeowners.
The increased tax revenue from limiting or eliminating the subsidy might be
used to subsidize those who truly need the assistance to become homeowners.
For many of the recipients of the tax subsidy, it is not the deciding factor in
whether they will buy a home. They would do so anyway. Moreover, if the
subsidy were eliminated, the price of housing would likely decline so that the
true value of the subsidy is hard to determine. If it is true that home prices
would decline if the subsidy were removed, and if there were more funds to
subsidize those in need of assistance, more people might be able to afford
houses.
Nevertheless, there is a segment of the home buying public for whom the
subsidy is the deciding factor in home purchases. But even if one accepts the
assumption that the deductions serve a generally beneficial societal purpose, it
is not clear that society should not expect a return from these beneficiaries of
the subsidy.
In many cases society has extracted specific concessions from
beneficiaries.
Consider other types of governmental subsidies for
homeownership. The United States Department of Housing and Urban
Development, for example, offers first-time homebuyer subsidies to certain
classes of municipal employees such as police, fire fighters and teachers. Both
HUD and local jurisdictions have a desire that such employees live in the
locales in which they work and many of these jurisdictions seek to enhance the
possibility of fulfilling that desire by offering assistance.99 However, because
of the government’s fear of opportunistic behavior by recipients, and its desire
to maximize the general benefit to be derived from the subsidy, some of these

98. Critique raised at Public Nature of Private Property Workshop at Georgetown Law (Nov.
14-15, 2008).
99. See Urban Homesteading, 24 C.F.R. § 590.7 (2009) (concerning the Department of
Housing and Urban Development’s Program); see also City of Buffalo, Urban Homestead
Program,
http://www.ci.buffalo.ny.us/Home/City_Departments/RealEstate/UrbanHomestead
Program (last visited Feb. 2, 2010) (describing Buffalo’s Urban Homestead Program); see
generally Mother Earth News, Urban Homesteading, http://www.motherearthnews.com/ModernHomesteading/1980-09-01/Community-Homesteading-Programs.aspx (last visited Feb. 2, 2010).
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jurisdictions place minimum occupancy requirements on the recipients with a
payback of the subsidy and, perhaps some of the equity, if the recipient leaves
the property prior to the designated time.100
Similarly, some jurisdictions have created urban homesteading programs101
through which they give vacant and often derelict properties to buyers for little
or no money. In exchange for this subsidy, the jurisdictions often require that
buyers bring the building up to code standards within a certain period of time
and live in the building as their primary residence for a period of time, often
several years, or they forfeit some or all of the equity.102 To do otherwise in
this or other subsidy programs would turn public housing funds into private
wealth creation, a housing program into a cash transfer program.103
2. The Concept of Property Redux
The second reason I do not accept the argument that shared equity creates
an inferior form of ownership brings us back to the beginning of this article.
The meaning of property is not fixed and consistent. It is, in Singer’s words,
contingent and contextual.104 The bundle of sticks is rarely, if ever, complete.
Ownership has become much more complex with many, often competing,
interests at work in any particular piece of property. Clearly, Blackstone’s
view is not now, if it ever was, applicable in practice. Society has needs that
must be preserved and the complete dominion by one over his or her property
is inconsistent with those needs, if for no other reason than that such dominion
likely will interfere with another’s use and enjoyment of his or her property.105
This is not to mention the huge area of the modern commons that needs to be
protected against private encroachment and degradation.
Such changing conceptions of property are not limited to land or to public
benefits. In another widely recognized area of property there has been a major
conceptual variation of the classic model. A good part of the governance
literature concerning publicly traded corporations relates to the separation of
ownership and management for shareholders. The classical view is that
shareholders own the corporation but it is clear that with very limited
exceptions (for example, institutional or large bloc-holding individuals)
shareholders have little or no ability to influence the policy or finances of
100. See sources cited in supra note 99.
101. See sources cited in supra note 99.
102. Habitat for Humanity in the District of Columbia requires a buyer to share the equity
based on a formula if the property is sold within fifteen years. See Byrne & Diamond, supra note
82, at 546.
103. Id. at 549.
104. Singer, supra note 5, at 4.
105. Thus, the law of nuisance protects against substantial and unreasonable interference with
a landowner’s use and enjoyment of his or her property. See, e.g., Morgan v. High Penn Oil Co.,
77 S.E.2d 682, 689 (N.C. 1953).
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publicly traded corporations. Even in the aggregate, typical shareholders do
not, and, in a practical sense, cannot have such influence. This is because such
shareholders have no economic incentive to monitor the corporation’s
activities, to organize other shareholders to take action against perceived
wrongdoing or bad policy, or even to attend shareholder meetings. In fact, the
existence of a ready market for the sale of their shares provides a rational
alternative for such shareholders to express their dissatisfaction.
The shareholders, similarly to most homeowners, have lost one or more of
the major sticks in their ownership bundle. They were offered a different
benefit, the protection of limited liability, in exchange for their loss of control.
In each case, there was some overriding social good to be achieved by the
limitations imposed. This is consistent with both the proprietary view of
property taken by writers from colonial times to the present and with the
contingent and contextual nature of property as seen across cultures and across
time.
VI. CONCLUSION
Under our form of government the use of property and the making of contracts
are normally matters of private and not public concern. The general rule is that
both shall be free from public interference. But neither property rights nor
contract rights are absolute; for government cannot exist if the citizen may at
will use his property to the detriment of his fellows, or exercise his freedom of
contract to work them harm. Equally fundamental with the private right is that
106
of the public to regulate it in the public interest.

Today, such regulatory mainstays as the Fair Housing and Public
Accommodation laws, environmental protections such as the Clean Air and
Clean Water Acts, zoning laws, housing and building codes, and rent controls
have reduced the Blackstonian and Lockean views of property to the academic
dust bin. Instead of despotic dominion, the regulatory regime has redefined
property in Gregory Alexander’s proprietarian model. What had once been the
tension between individual rights and communal rights has been resolved, if
not completely, at least substantially, in the direction of protecting the broader
society. The interdependence of people, of localities, even of nations, demands
that dominion be tempered and the common good be pursued.
The common good can be perceived as preserving affordable housing
for the long term. The private market cannot or will not meet the societal need
for such housing. Sharing equity is one attempt by the public to meet that
need. Society has an interest in the retention of the subsidy it provides to the
affordable housing market. The recipient of the subsidy has an interest in the
general benefits of homeownership. The limitation on equity retention by the

106. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 523 (1934).
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homeowner is a means of accommodating both sets of preferences. Moreover,
it is entirely consistent with the restrictions placed on all forms of property to
meet societal concerns. A classicist might then argue that property as
envisaged today has regressed from Locke and Blackstone’s conception
(although this would disregard the rich history of differing views of property)
but it is much more difficult to single out shared equity housing as a significant
departure from the conceptual and regulatory trend of modern society.
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